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1. INTRODUCTION
The official apparatus in each American law jurisdiction for
governance of attorney conduct is that state's, commonwealth's, or
territory's supreme judicial courts.' In this Article, I argue that
these apparatuses largely fail to offer ethical guidance or direction
to lawyers serving in local government official capacities, but
holding neither elected nor judicial positions. Citizens support the
notion of external codes of professional responsibility for such
persons, not necessarily because they believe that "lawyering
rules" are well constructed or properly enforced, but because they
doubt lawyers truly are self-governing in ways promoting fairness
or basic cultural values. 2 The failure of the attorney regulatory
process is acutely felt in the local government realm. There,
attorneys adjudicate through administrative hearing processes
while serving as unelected and temporary decision-makers. The
public is intimately acquainted with those processes as direct
participants.
There are thousands of local governments in America, with
estimates ranging to upwards of 90,000 jurisdictions.3 Substantial
numbers of attorneys act as hearing officers in those communities
in a variety of roles.4 Some are independent contractors,5 while
* All rights reserved C 2011 by the author, counsel to Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman
& Balint, P.C.; Zoning Adjustment Hearing Officer, City of Phoenix (2010
present) and Associate Faculty, University of Phoenix School of Business. My
colleague Kevin R. Hanger, Esq. gave useful insights into an earlier version of this
paper, and I thank him. This essay is dedicated to Mary Widener, my earliest
integrity guide. The first step in deciphering the Atticus Code is to review the
definitions in the Appendix to this paper.
' DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, REAL ETHICS FOR REAL LAWYERS 4 (2005).
2 See infra notes 82 and 102.
There are purportedly more than 19,000 municipal governments, more than
16,000 town or township governments, more than three thousand county
governments, more than 13,000 school districts and more than 35,000 special district
governments; the precise figures and their categories are described at the WEBSITE
FOR THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org (last visited Oct. 12,
2011).
4 For example, the City of Chicago employs private attorneys to serve as
hearing officers in parking violations controversies, and in election board candidate
eligibility disputes. See Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 713 N.E.2d 754, 758-60
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others volunteer their services. Irrespective of compensation, I
argue that in a "non-counselor" role, Atticus is essentially
ungoverned by codes of attorney professional conduct. Thus,
potential for mischief abides, which is a circumstance worsened by
the failure of many communities to impose standards of ethical
behavior on these contractors or volunteers. I argue that in many
instances the lone governing ethic affecting such lawyers'
behavior, as they fulfill their hearing officers' roles, is their oaths
of admission 6 to practice before the bar. These oaths, sworn at the
commencement of bar admission, are marginalized if not ignored
altogether' in discussions of appropriate lawyer professional
conduct where the representation of clients is not implicated.
The recent spate of local government administrative
adjudications concerning implementing medical marijuana
enterprises illustrates certain dilemmas arising when lawyers hear
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Tammy Webber, Hearing Officer: Emanuel Can Run for
Chicago Mayor, YAHOO!NEWS (Dec. 23, 2010), http://news.yahoo.com/chicago-
panel-ready-decide-emanuel-ballot-20101222-141704-400.html. In the District of
Columbia, private attorneys are hired as special education hearing officers. See
Request for Quotation (RFQ) DCGD-2009-R0046,
http://app.ocp.dc.gov/pdf/DCGD-2009-R-0046_M.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
In Minnesota, the use of private attorneys as hearing officers in local governments
has been that jurisdiction's custom. See Raymond Krause, Minnesota's OAH: 30
Years of Innovation in Administrative Review, 63 Bench & B. of Minn. 2 (Feb.
2006), available at http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2006/feb06/mnoah.htm.
Naturally, not all local hearing officers are licensed attorneys, retired attorneys or
persons with law degrees. "Atticus" is therefore carefully defined in the Appendix.
' See Haas v. County of San Bernadino, 45 P.3d 280 (Cal. 2002).
6 Views on the genesis and history of oaths of admission, and their distortion
of purpose commingled with loyalty oaths, are contained in Carol Rice Andrews,
The Lawyer's Oath: Both Ancient and Modern, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 3 (2009),
and in Mary Elizabeth Basile, Loyalty Testing for Attorneys: When is it Necessary
and Who Should Decide?, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1843, 1847-51 (2009). Andrews
points out that while the admissions oath continues to serve regulatory and ethical
functions, both functions "can be enhanced," and an oath "would better serve the
profession if it more accurately and clearly stated the essential ethical maxims by
which lawyers swear to abide." Andrews, supra note 6, at 57. Perhaps this lack of
clarity explains certain behaviors of attorneys engaged in positions of public trust at
all levels of government.
' See Andrews, supra note 6, at 44. In the Arizona State Bar ethics opinion,
infra note 8, the attorney's oath of admission goes unmentioned and, as explained
further, infra text accompanying notes 25-26, a rule of court unambiguously
imposing an attorney obligation to support federal law is disregarded.
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local permit applications. Recent ethics opinions from state bar
associations, 8 advising lawyers on subjects addressing questionable
legality, further suggest the "out of touch" nature of the legal
profession's ethical governance role. While community
governments appear to have little capacity to dictate lawyer
behavior, they largely have performed dismally to the extent their
authority exists. State supreme courts, with input from the
administrative law bench and bar associations can, and must,
determine whether they prefer to have Atticus seek his own way or
afford him a map and compass to navigate the thin space
separating public service from abuse of public office. If they will
not choose, then communities must incorporate the lawyers who
are deciders into the coverage of codes of ethical behavior
currently governing local elected officials and full-time employed
adjudicators.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II summarizes the
status of medical marijuana regulation in states that welcome such
operations. It describes local government adjudications regulating
these vendors of goods and services and focuses on the zoning
realm in Phoenix, Arizona as backdrop to Atticus's ethical
conundrum. Part III examines the legal and professional
responsibility issues confronting Atticus in a community
adjudication role, focusing on this elemental question: should
Atticus convene hearings determining matters surrounding
medicinal Cannabis enterprises - and ethically, what are his
options? Part IV recapitulates the paucity of written standards
applying to Atticus's conduct as decider; here, the need of state
supreme courts or local governments to fill the gap involving
ethical performance expectations is illustrated. Part V serves two
functions: first, anticipating Atticus's unpredictable decider
performance resulting from the lack of applicable ethical
standards, and second, reminding the reader that current public
attitudes toward unregulated lawyers erode confidence in the
administrative state. Part VI suggests how communities and state
8 See, e.g., State Bar of Ariz., Ethics Op. 11-01 (2011), available at
http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=7 10; Me. Prof 1 Ethics
Comm'n, Op. #199 (2010).
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supreme courts can implement standards appropriate for Atticus's
role and concurrently satisfy public expectations for the local
adjudicative process.
II. CURRENT MEDICAL MARIJUANA REGULATION IN AMERICAN
JURISDICTIONS
Sixteen states and the District of Columbia have approved
the sale to licensed patients of ingestible versions of Cannabis.9
Another six states' legislatures have proposed legislation
permitting medicinal Cannabis use as of March 1, 2011.10 it
appears that, if the federal law enforcement community maintains
its present posture, retailing to prescription holders will remain
entrenched. Uncertainty persists about the federal posture on
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970," the
For a detailed list of the affected jurisdictions together with the dates and
manner of passage of legalization, see 16 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC,
PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000881 (last
updated Oct. 25, 2011). The sixteen jurisdictions with medical marijuana laws
(parenthetically, with dates of authorization) are Alaska (1998); Arizona (2010);
California (1996); Colorado (2000); District of Columbia (2010); Hawaii (2000);
Maine (1999); Michigan (2008); Montana (2004); Nevada (2000); New Jersey
(2010); New Mexico (2007); Oregon (1998); Rhode Island (2006); Vermont (2004);
and Washington (1998). Id.
'0 For a comprehensive chart of status of pending legislation in the six states
as of August 4, 2011, see 6 States with Pending Legislation to Legalize Medical
MarUuana, PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=002481 (last
updated Sept. 19, 2011).
" Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (2006). Cannabis is a
"Schedule I" substance, a category reserved for the supposedly most dangerous and
addictive substances that possess no medicinal value. Marijuana specifically is
excluded from the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act by 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)(3) (2006).
On April 20, 2006, the FDA declared that "no sound scientific studies" supported the
medicinal use of smoked marijuana. See Gardiner Harris, FDA Dismisses Medical
Benefit from Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, April 21, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/health/21marijuana.html. In mid-2007, the
Drug Enforcement Administration's Los Angeles and San Francisco offices
reminded landlords that, California law notwithstanding, the federal government
could seize owners' property in response to illegal marijuana co-op and dispensary
operations. See Cameron Scott, Pot Clinics Fight the Feds, CAL. LAWYER, Mar.
2009, available at http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=899964&evid=1. No
asset forfeitures resulted in the immediately following months.
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federal act scheduling Cannabis as a drug that cannot be sold,
transported or possessed (whether or not for sale) without the actor
having felony liability. In October 2009, the Justice Department
issued a letterl 2 stating the Obama Administration's preference that
U.S. District Attorneys not prosecute purveyors and users of
Cannabis acting in clear compliance with the requirements of state
law. In February 2011, however, the U.S. District Attorney for the
District of Northern California advised the Oakland City Attorney
and the California Attorney General that it would not tolerate that
city's licensing of commercial (i.e., unattached to a dispensary or
collective operation, and growing in bulk) cultivators.' 3 Even in
the face of ambiguity about federal government enforcement
policy,14 the fundamental fact that Cannabis possession and sale is
illegal under federal law has not changed."
12 U.S. Deputy Attorney General David Ogden, in an October 19, 2009 letter
to federal prosecutors, cautioned the use of limited federal resources in prosecuting
individuals who complied with state medical marijuana laws. See Memorandum
from the United States Department of Justice for Selected United States Attorneys
(Oct. 19, 2009) (on file with author) (the "Ogden Memorandum"). But the memo
does not ban all such prosecutions. See Tracy Russo, Memorandum for Selected
United State Attorneys on Investigations and Prosecutions on States Authorizing the
Medical Use of Marijuana, THE JUSTICE BLOG (Oct. 19, 2009),
http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/192. Instead, it served as a "guide to the
exercise of investigative and prosecutorial discretion." Id. The printed text of the
Ogden Memorandum is available in Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the
Department ofJustice's New Approach to Medical Mariuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y.
REV. 633, 667-68, app. (2011). The Ogden Memorandum notes that prosecution of
"commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and sell marijuana for profit"
continues to be an enforcement priority. Ogden Memorandum, supra. The
Department warned that "claims of compliance with state or local law may mask
operations inconsistent with the terms, conditions, or purposes of those laws." Id.
Furthermore, the Ogden Memorandum notes that federal prosecutors are not
expected to charge, prove, or otherwise establish any state law violations, and
compliance with state law does not create a legal defense to a violation of the
Controlled Substances Act. Id.
13 See Letter from Melinda Haag, United States Attorney for the Northern
District of California, to John Russo, Oakland's City Attorney (Feb. 1, 2011) (on file
with author). In that letter, U.S. Attorney Haag announced her office's intention to
enforce the Controlled Substances Act's prohibitions against "manufacturing and
distribution activity involving marijuana, even if such activities are permitted under
state law." Id.
14 See Mikos, supra note 12, at 640-46. An apparent advocate for the
"legalization" of marijuana for all purposes, Mikos opines that the Department of
A comprehensive analysis of each state (or applicable local)
government's rules for establishing and monitoring medical
marijuana entrepreneurs is beyond the scope of this Article. It is
sufficient to point out that a number of administrative procedures
on the state and local levels are implicated in the licensing of a
Justice ("DOJ") will have difficulty ensuring that federal prosecutors cooperate in
the "hold your fire" guideline of non-enforcement pronounced in the Ogden
Memorandum. Id. at 634, 640-41, 645. Mikos' view is supported by the raft of
advisory memoranda issued by other government agencies immediately following
the DOJ's 2009 letter. For instance, the Office of National Drug Control Policy
issued a statement stressing that the DOJ guidelines should not be interpreted as the
federal government's approval of the medicinal use of Cannabis. [Web page no
longer available]. The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") issued a similar
statement. See DEA Statement on New Department of Justice Marijuana
Guidelines, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 2009),
wwwjustice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/prl02209.html. The federal Department of
Transportation also issued a statement clarifying that the DOJ's guidelines do not
impact the DOT's drug testing program. See Jim L. Sawrt, DOT Office of Drug and
Alcohol Policy and Compliance Notice, DOT.GOV (Oct. 22, 2009),
www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/Medical-Marijuana-Notice.pdf. For the DEA
Position on Marijuana , see The DEA Position on Maryuana, JUSTICE.GOV (Jan.
2011), http://www.justice.gov/dea/marijuana position.pdf. After the State of
Arizona filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit against the United States for
clarification of the enforceability of Arizona Proposition 203, Congressmen Frank of
Massachusetts and Polis of Colorado requested, in a June 20, 2011 letter, that
Attorney General Eric Holder reaffirm the DOJ's apparent intentions not to
prosecute in federal court as suggested by the Ogden Memorandum, leaving
enforcement of Controlled Substances Act violations to the states. See Mike Lillis,
Reps. Frank, Polis urge DOJ to leave medical marijuana to states, The Hill (June
21, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/state-issues/1 67537-reps-
frank-polis-urge-doj-to-leave-medical-marijuana-to-states. Arizona's declaratory
judgment action against the United States is found at Arizona v. United States, No.
CV11-1072-PHX-SRB (D. Ariz. May 27, 2011) (Justia.com).
Is See, e.g., U.S. v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(citing Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F. 3d 850, 867 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2007)) (defendant's
argument that federal enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act against
individuals who are in compliance with California law violates the Tenth
Amendment rejected by court). Stacy concludes that "the federal government may
criminalize behavior that is not criminalized under state law." Id. In a later order in
the Stacy proceedings, the court stated: "A reasonable belief that one will not be
prosecuted is not the same thing as a reasonable belief that one's actions do not
violate federal law." Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Present Certain
Defenses and Granting United States' Motions in Limine to Preclude Defenses, U.S.
v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (Jul. 12, 2010) (No. 09cr3695 BTM), available at
http://americansforsafeaccess.org/downloads/StacyRuling.pdf.
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medical marijuana dispensary or cultivation site.16 In the City of
Phoenix, applicants for licensure as a dispensary or cultivation site
must receive a use permit for its location. The approval of
particular uses of land, under a so-called "special exception" or
"use permit" contemplated by a specific zoning district, but not
permitted as a matter of right, may occur following an
administrative hearing by the Zoning Administrator or his
designated hearing officer.17 In many urban communities, the
Zoning Administrator's burden is lightened because hearing
officers often conduct initial hearings. As a first-line adjudicator,
the hearing officer's determination on a variance or use permit is
subject to intermediate appeal to the board of zoning adjustment or
the municipal council.18
III. ATTICUS MEETS CANNABIS
Arizona's participating local jurisdictions, like those in other
states, adopted ordinance amendments addressing the passage of
the "medical marijuana" initiative on the State's November 2, 2010
ballot. 19 Then on December 15, 20 10,20 Phoenix adopted a text
" Among these administrative procedures in Arizona is the requirement for
State Department of Health Services' approval of dispensary registration certificates,
for licensure of cultivation facilities (by law dispensaries must cultivate 70% of their
own product), for County Health Department approval if the dispensary operators
are making food products, and for city zoning adjustments (such as use permits) and
site plan approvals. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2801 et seq. (2007).
" The hearing officer, in granting a special exception, must find in the
circumstances that the proposed use does not implicate significant additional traffic,
noise, vibration, light, odors or other noxious impacts in the surroundings and will
not lead to the decline in neighboring property values. See, PHOENIX CITY CODE,
ZONING ORDINANCE §307(A) (2011) (citations hereafter abbreviated "PZO").
' See, e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-462.06(I), 11-816(D) (2010). In
most jurisdictions, the post-citizens' board level of appeal of an adverse adjustment
determination is to the inferior or trial court level of the state's judiciary. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-425 (1987); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1094.5 (2009).
19 1-04-2010, unofficially "Proposition 203" on the ballot, passed by 4,340
votes. See Statewide Results: November 2, 2010 General Election, STATE OF
ARIZONA, http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/AZ/22333/40707/en/summary.html
(last updated Nov. 23, 2010, 3:38:28 PM).
20 See Staff Report: Zoning Ordinance Text Amendment Application No. Z-
TA-10-10, PHOENIX.GOV (Dec. 8, 2010), http://phoenix.gov/PLANNING/Z-TA-10-
10.pdf.
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amendment to its Zoning Ordinance that requires the City's grant
of a use permit for the operation of a Cannabis dispensary and
dispensary-related cultivation. The federal Controlled Substances
Act of 1970 schedules Cannabis as a substance the sale or
possession of which is a criminal offense.21  This process
unavoidably implicates "conflict preemption,"2 insofar as the
decider granting a use permit participates in the community's
sanctioning possession and sale of a substance (a Schedule I drug),
21See, e.g., People v. Finney, No. 09-4081-FH-L (Midland Cnty. Cir. Ct.
June 8, 2011), available at http://www.co.midland.mi.us/files/1305.pdf (positive
conflict exists between the Controlled Substances Act and Michigan's Medical
Marihuana Act; the latter is an obstacle to fulfillment of Congress's objectives and
therefore is unconstitutional). See also 21 U.S.C. §844(a) (simple possession of a
Schedule I controlled substance is unlawful). U.S. Deputy Attorney General David
Ogden, in an October 19, 2009 memo to federal prosecutors, cautioned the use of
limited federal resources in prosecuting individuals complying with state medical
marijuana laws. See Ogden Memorandum at 1. See also supra note 13. Local
governments' prerogatives of consultation and approval for these medical marijuana
operations implicate the areas of zoning, business licensure, sales tax, cultivation
(agriculture) and food handling (comestible products), among others, potentially
subject to local public hearings.
2 See generally Michelle Patton, The Legalization of Marijuana: A Dead-
end or the High Road to Fiscal Solvency?, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 163, 179-84
(2010) (discussing preemption issues in the marijuana arena). Conflict preemption
dictating supersession of federal drug law over state regulation of Schedule I drugs
(i.e., those with addictive properties that possess no medicinal value according to
federal regulators) purportedly prescribed for medical purposes, is established under
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 14 (2005). The Court's opinion asserts that
precedents "firmly established" Congress' Commerce Clause power to regulate
purely local activities forming part of a "class of activities" substantially affecting
interstate commerce, where that class of activities is the national marijuana market.
Id. at 8. Local use affected supply and demand in this national marijuana market
justifies the "essential" regulation of intrastate use of a drug's national market. The
United States Supreme Court has taken a more moderate view of "essential
regulation" of Schedule II drugs. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 272-73
(2006) (the Controlled Substances Act did not grant expansive federal authority to
regulate medicine by defining the scope of legitimate medical practice but merely
prevented doctors from participating in illicit recreational drug dealing). The Food
and Drug Administration on April 20, 2006 declared that no reliable science
supported the medical efficacy of smoked marijuana. See Gardiner Harris, FDA
Contradicts Panel, Says Mariuana Has No Medical Value (April 21, 2006),
available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/635201354/FDA-contradicts-
panel-says-marijuana-has-no-medicinal-value.
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the possession and sale of which are illegal under the Controlled
Substances Act. 23
A local government's administrative department directors
decide who adjudicates Cannabis dispensary and cultivator
licensing applications, but many are unaware of the risks of
involving Atticus in that process. The first risk is that Atticus
routinely denies use permit applications, in apparent discharge of
his lawyer's obligations to support federal law. 24 The second risk,
should Atticus proceed to act as a decider granting an MME
application, is that he may be subject to bar complaints from
persons disapproving of attorneys who disregard controlling
federal criminal statutes. But the fundamental issue for Atticus is
this - must he recuse himself from hearing such an application at
all? The not obvious response is affirmative, due to standards
governing conduct apart from Rules of Professional Conduct.
As noted above, possession and sale of Cannabis today are
statutory crimes. In Arizona, that fact terminates Atticus's inquiry,
but not owing to local official governmental ethics rules
prohibiting engagement with medicinal Cannabis enterprises. In
Arizona, all that stands between Atticus's errant involvements in
the hearing processes are the Oath of Admission to the Arizona
Bar ("Oath") and Rule 41(b) of the Arizona Supreme Court Rules
("Court Rules"). The initial paragraph of the Oath requires each
admittee to avow that "I will support the Constitution of the United
States," while Rule 41(b) obligates members of the bar to "support
the constitution and the laws of the United States and of this
state." 25 The Oath occupies an honored place as a small-font note
23 This act is Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, and is codified at 21 U.S.C. §801 et seq.
24 In communities with ordinances like Phoenix's (before a January, 2011
amendment), the Zoning Administrator's required findings, in a special exception
case involving a medical marijuana establishment applicant, were textually
impossible to make. Previously, PZO § 307(A)(7)(b) required a finding by the
hearing officer that the use permit will be "in compliance with all provisions" of the
laws of Phoenix and the United States. Since 21 U.S.C. §844(a) criminalizes
possession of Cannabis, Atticus grants a use permit in Arizona, in violation of his
sworn oath to "support the Constitution of the United States" and a rule of the
Supreme Court of Arizona obligating an attorney support the "laws of the United
States." See ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 41(b).
25 Id. Arizona is not alone in requiring attorney support of the laws of the
United States. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §608(a) ("support the Constitution
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following Rule 41 of the Court Rules, a provision primarily
addressing exceptions to the "unauthorized practice" of law. Rule
41 lies outside the voluminous catalog of the Arizona Rules of
Professional Conduct known as Rule 42. It seems likely that
neither is much consulted or even recalled. 26 And it is ironic that
such short expressions of "support" afford all the effective
attorney-conduct standards in these circumstances. 27 Fortuitously,
"support" is far less ambiguous than "acknowledge" or "observe."
"Support" connotes affirmative action beyond a mere nod to
regulations in effect. Even if the interpretation that support means
"uphold" is unsatisfactory to the rational mind, such a mind must
acknowledge the proposition that support of, and undermining the
force of, a statute are logically incompatible. 28 Atticus undermines
and the laws of the United States and of this State"); IND. CODE § 33-43-1-3, 3(1)
("support the Constitution and laws of the United States and of Indiana"). Andrews,
supra note 6 at 48, asserts that twenty one states' oaths of admissions require a
lawyer to swear to support to "the relevant laws and constitution."
26 See Andrews, supra note 6. But see, e.g., Alan P. Bayham, Jr., Esquire -
Have You Earned Your Title? 47ARIZ. ATT'Y. 6 (2010) (professional responsibility
rules apply to attorneys at all times; and the solemn oath attorneys take requires
assuming "a special role when it comes to the law"). Bayham's reverie recalls a
time when bar disciplinary proceedings cited the attorneys' oath of office as
evidence of unacceptably substandard honesty and integrity. See, e.g., In re
Holovachka, 198 N.E. 2d 381, 390-91 (Ind. 1964) (prosecutor's disbarment); State
ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Wiebusch, 45 N.W. 2d 583, 586-89 (Neb. 1951)
(judge disbarred). There is no reference to Rule 41(b) or the Oath of Admissions in
Arizona State Bar Ethics Committee Opinion (11-01) (Feb. 2011) on the propriety of
Arizona attorneys advising medical marijuana enterprises, and the Opinion
concludes that limited types of counsel to clients (advising clients about "complying
with" the state's medical marijuana act ["Act"] and formally representing clients
before a governmental agency regarding licensing and certification issues) are
acceptable if the client "wishes to proceed with a course of action specifically
authorized by the Act." Ethics Op., supra note 8.
2 The irony stems from the fact that the oath is a condition on the right to
practice a lawyer's profession, yet in many jurisdictions the oath itself does not
trigger discipline of the attorney, since the modem rules of professional conduct
address in far greater detail commonly committed offenses. Andrews, supra note 6,
at 50, 54-55. But see ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 31(a)(2)(E) (unprofessional conduct means
"substantial or repeated violations of the Oath of Admission to the Bar"). When the
lawyer knows that a particular vow does not subject him or her to discipline, the
value of the whole oath is diminished - indeed, when any portion of the oath is
disregarded, the entire oath is endangered. See Andrews, supra note 6, at 59.
2 Subadjacent support and undermining are diametrically opposed property
concepts when subsidence of adjacent land from excavation is concerned. See
STEPHEN MARTIN LEAKE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF USES AND PROFITS OF LAND 243
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federal statutory efficacy in approving local medical marijuana
applications or permits in blatant disregard of law. He must stand
down.
IV. ATTICus's GOVERNANCE IN AD Hoc HEARING OFFICER ROLES
A. State Supreme Court Regulations
Rule 42 of the Court Rules catalogs the Arizona Rules of
Professional Conduct ("RPC") for Arizona attorneys, which
govern the behavior of practicing lawyers in pursuit of their
livelihoods. 2 9 The RPC is based upon the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.30 Judges employed in the judicial
branch of state government in Arizona are governed in the
performance of their duties and certain extra-judicial conduct by
the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.31 Like similar codes in
every American jurisdiction, the RPC is based on the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct ("CJC"). 3 2 The State of Arizona has not
extended the ALJ Code to govern admitted attorneys serving as
administrative law judges, hearing officers, or referees working in
the state.33 Nor has Arizona's legislature statutorily applied any
analogous code of professional standards 34 pertaining to the
performance of such administrative law functions. The Arizona
Supreme Court has declined to extend its version of the CJC to
(1888) (owners of adjacent tenements are presumptively entitled to such support
from the other as will preserve the tenements in their natural state).
29 See ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 42.
' MODEL CODE OF PROF'L. RESPONSIBILITY (1980).
31See ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 81.
32 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
3 Indeed, as of this writing, only about ten American states have adopted the
ALJ Code or something based on it. See infra note 94. The New York State Bar
adopted its Model Code of Judicial Conduct for Administrative Law Judges in April
2009, available at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/SubstantiveReports/ModelALJCode4
409.
34 See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for Administrative Law
Judges: Adoption of a Uniform Code of Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary, 11
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 18-23 (2002) (identifying options for governance).
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non-judicial branch adjudicators,3 5 despite the 2007 American Bar
Association amendment to that code's model, which expanded the
meaning of "judge" to include members of the "administrative law
judiciary."3 6 In Arizona, local attorney adjudicators, except those
bound by community-adopted public employee ethical codes
incorporating the law, have no moorings.37
Seeking guidance in these matters from the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Responsibility 38 is
futile. ER 1.11 of the RPC disqualifies "public officers" from
participating in [adjudicating or hearing] any matter in which the
lawyer engaged prior to acting in a governance capacity of any
sort. But the comment to that rule addresses the lawyer's
exploitation of the office for the advantage of a private client. The
closest comment affording any guidance to lawyer hearing officers
in Arizona on the issue of fidelity to existing law is a RPC
comment to ER 3.9. The 2003 amendment to that ethical rule, in
comment 2, addresses advocating in non-adjudicative proceedings,
stating that the lawyer must conform to provisions of other ERs. It
finds that lawyers in such environments are subject "to regulations
inapplicable to advocates who are not lawyers. However,
3 Id. at 13 (catalogs states extending the CJC to administrative law judges
prior to its 2007 ABA revision).
36 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Application I(B), n. 1; see also
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT at 4 (Reporter's Explanation of Changes to
"Scope"), available at
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/ABA2007modelcodeasapproved.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2010). Each jurisdiction is urged to consider characteristics of the judging
function in deciding whether to adopt or adapt the CJC for its administrative law
judiciary.
" This issue is not peculiar to Arizona local hearing officers where, as the
author argues, no City of Phoenix or State of Arizona statutes, regulations, or codes
govern their behavior unless they are City employees. See, e.g., Cheri Ruch, What
Ethical Code Governs a $54 Million Pair of Pants in Idaho? 53 THE ADVOCATE 15
(2010) (the author, an Idaho attorney and Industrial Commission Hearing Officer,
indicates that Idaho has no relevant codes of conduct for administrative hearing
officers, and Idaho's code of ethics for attorneys has no relevant provisions
addressing the issues of the role of attorneys as hearing officers). These ethical
issues are more widely dispersed than in just two jurisdictions. Id.
" Rule 42 of the RPC states: "The professional conduct of members shall be
governed by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar
Association, adopted August 2, 1983, as amended by this court and adopted as the
Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct." ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 42.
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legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect
lawyers to deal with them as they deal with courts." 39
B. Administrative Adjudicatory Codes
In 1995, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct for State
Administrative Law Judges40 was endorsed by the Executive
Committee of the National Conference of the Administrative Law
Judiciary of the Judicial Division of the American Bar
Association.41 Four years later, a similar code of conduct for state
administrative law judges was endorsed by the Board of Governors
of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary.4 2
39 ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 42, E.R. 3.9, comment 2. The comment begs the
question whether applicants seeking zoning adjustment or any other local
government permissions deserve less deference than their community's public
institutions. Does the role of "advocate" require higher ethical standards than apply
to attorneys acting as public servants that are not advocating while purporting to
uphold the public interest? The last question's answer appears to be "sure." After
all, adjustment hearings clearly do not pose dilemmas stemming from advocacy or
communications with a tribunal when the attorney hearing officer is the tribunal's
designee. Cf John W. Cooley, Defining the Ethical Limits of Acceptable Deception
in Mediation, 11 J. DUPAGE Co. B. AssN. 29 (2007) (observing that the Ethical
Standards of Professional Responsibility of the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution make a passing reference to duties a mediator owes to parties, the
profession and themselves and prescribes that mediators should be honest without
explaining what "honest" means, and that MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 1 (1990) gives no guidance regarding a judge's duty to be truthful to others -
thus, nothing proscribes the use of deception by a neutral during the mediation
process).
40 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF THE ADMIN. LAW JUDICIARY, MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMIN. LAW JUDGES (1995).
41 Id. at Preface. This Code's Preamble defines "administrative law judge"
to include:
all hearing officers, referees, trial examiners or any other person
holding non-partisan office to whom the authority to conduct an
administrative adjudication has been delegated by the agency or by statute
and who exercises independent and impartial judgment . . . in accordance
with the applicable statutes or agency rules . . . . Id.
42 NAT'L Ass'N. OF ADMIN. LAW JUDICIARY, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMIN. LAW JUDGES (1999), available at
http://www.naalj.org/assets/documents/publications/naalj_%20modelcode of judic
ial conduct for state-aljs.pdf. (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). This code, in Canon 8,
recites: "Anyone employed by a state governmental agency or an instrumentality of
a state or municipal corporation, who is empowered to preside over statutory or
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Inasmuch as the two codes essentially have identical application
where appointed municipal hearing officers are concerned,43 I refer
to them in this Article interchangeably as the "ALJ Code."
In some states, ethical guidance for lawyers is afforded
through the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)." Often state
APA acts are based upon the Model State Administrative
Procedures Act.45  In other states, however, the APA does not
apply to officers serving outside of state agencies, so these
standards of conduct do not address adherence to the law.46
Municipalities often govern certain behaviors of persons acting as
public officials through a code of ethics. In the City of Phoenix,
employees and "officials, whether elected, appointed or hired," 47
regulatory fact-finding hearings" is included in the definition of a state
administrative law judge subject to its terms. Id.
43 Compare note 40 with note 42, supra.
" See Edward J. Felter, Jr., Administrative Law Adjudication for the 21st
Century, 24 COLO. LAW. 993 (1995).
45 See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (2010), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/msapa/2010_fmal.htm. In 1981, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised its 1961
Model State Administrative Procedures Act; most states have adopted one form or
the other of the model act through state legislation. Id. In July, 2010, that
Conference adopted the Revised Model State Administrative Procedures Act
(RMSAP). Id.
46 In the State of Arizona, the APA recites that it does not apply to persons
acting under the auspices of "political subdivisions" of the State. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(1) ("agency" does not include a political subdivision of this
state or any of the administrative units of a political subdivision, and political
subdivision includes cities and towns). See Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 204 P.2d 854
(Ariz. 1949). Consequently, hearing officers appointed by the cities are not within
the ambit of any strictures of Arizona's APA. This is not a circumstance unique to
Arizona. See, e.g., Nightlife Partners, Ltd., et al. v. City of Beverly Hills, 108 Cal.
App. 4th 81, 91 (2003) (California's APA [CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 11340-14529] does
not apply to hearings before local administrative agencies; however, those provisions
should influence discussion of what constitutes fair procedures for use in local
administrative hearings).
47 See CITY OF PHOENIX ETHICS HANDBOOK 1 (Section I) (last modified June
20, 2000), available at icma.org/en/icma/knowledge
network/documents/kn/Document/487 1/Ethics Handbook City of Phoenix Arizona.
The Handbook requires all City employees and members of boards, commissions,
committees, and the City Council to maintain the utmost standards of personal
integrity, truthfulness, honesty, and fairness in carrying out their public duties. Id.
The City adopted the Handbook policies as a City ordinance, and thus "all City
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are subject to ethical standards, but deciders who are volunteers or
independent contractors are exempt.4 8  Indeed, whether deciders
are governed by rules of judicial conduct for lawyers promulgated
by a legislature or the state bar (or Supreme Court) in any state is
driven by political geography.49
C. The Limited Utility of Professional Responsibility Commentary
Deference to reputable commentary on the subject of
hearing officer attorneys offers one conventional source for
gleaning proper conduct standards, together with state bars' ethics
opinions.50 The Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct,5' the
employees and members of City boards, commissions and committees, and the City
Council," are charged to obey those policies. Id.
48 Id. Neither an independent contractor nor an uncompensated hearing
officer (since, acting alone, neither would be a member of a board, commission,
committee nor City Council) is bound by Phoenix's Handbook, unless one adopts
the notion that, since the Zoning Administrator is an employee, her non-employee
deputies must likewise be subject to the policies of the Handbook applicable to
employees, a questionable argument from a reasonable reading of the text's
language. Id. Regardless, nowhere does the Handbook say that a covered person
must follow the law in effect, except as one may infer that obligation from the
requirement of maintaining "utmost standards" of honesty and fairness, two terms
not defined. "Neglect" of coverage by codes of volunteers and independent
contractors is not unusual among municipal bodies. See, e.g., Robert Wechsler, Who
is Covered by an Ethics Code's Provisions, CITYETHICS.ORG BLOG (Jan. 31, 2009
10:17 AM) http://www.cityethics.org/node/629 (sometimes there is discussion about
whether volunteers should be covered; too often individuals and bodies not central to
local government are ignored, and among those groups often missed in a local ethics
code are "consultants, professionals hired to do specific jobs or work on specific
projects.") Wechsler, Director of Research with City Ethics, further notes that in
ethics codes with a separate provision listing those covered by the code, "this
provision is usually limited to officials and employees, excluding, for example,
volunteers." Id.
49 For example, in the State of California, hearing officers are deemed quasi-
judicial functionaries, and are therefore subject to the State's Code of Judicial
Conduct. See CAL Gov'T. CODE §§ 11475-11475.70 (West Supp. 2006). But in the
State of Arizona, the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee issued an advisory opinion
excluding anyone acting as a hearing officer from the reach of that State's Code of
Judicial Conduct. See AZ Jud. Adv. Comm., Op. 92-03, at 1-2 (Jan. 1992),
available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/ethics opinions/1992/92-03.pdf
(Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to administrative law judges).
so Regrettably, bar ethics opinions typically are tailored to specific requests
for advice in practice conundrums. For example, in Opinion 11-01, the State Bar of
Arizona opined on the ethics of assisting a client in legal matters permissible under
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Restatement Third, The Law Governing Lawyers,5 2 and Hazard
and Hodes' The Law of Lawyering,53 while leading secondary
authorities, afford few useful answers to the ethical dilemmas
facing private attorneys serving as local hearing officers.54 The
Restatement Third, the Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement")
is similarly unavailing; it, too, fails to address Atticus's obligation,
as an attorney, to support the law. 5 The Restatement recites only
one principle helpful to this Article's themes, relating to the
the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act "despite the fact that such conduct potentially
may violate applicable federal law." AZ Jud. Adv. Op. 11-01 (Feb. 2011), available
at http://www.myazbar.org/Ethics/opinionview.cfin?id=710. A more interesting
opinion would have addressed whether a lawyer could simultaneously represent a
client in a matter governed by the state act and comply with Arizona Supreme Court
Rule 4 1(b).
51 ABA/BNA, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2003)
(hereinafter "Lawyers' Manual").
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000)
("R3LGL").
s3 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING (3d ed. 2010).
54 The Lawyers' Manual states, in §01:3024, that the applicability of the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct to administrative law judges should be determined
by each adopting jurisdiction. Lawyers' Manual, supra note 51, at n. 10. The
ABA's Judicial Administration Division urges each jurisdiction to "consider the
characteristics of particular positions within the administrative law judiciary in
adopting, adapting, applying and enforcing the Code [CJC] for the administrative
law judiciary." CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS' NOTES To
THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 15-16 (2009). As to the R3LGL's
inapplicability, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Silences of the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers: Lawyering as Only Adversary Practice, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 631, 633-34, 657 (1997).
" Topic 1, §1, comment b of the R3LGL observes that "lawyer codes
particularize some general legal rules in the particular occupational situation of
lawyers ..... RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, Topic 1, §
1, cmt. b at 8 (2000) (emphasis added). The commentary seems to recognize that the
codes deal with the context of lawyer as advocate and a lawyer's communications
with clients and tribunals, not with the instance where a lawyer serves as a part of
the tribunal, that being, one supposes, the bailiwick of rules governing the ethical
behavior of judges. Indeed, that comment reminds the reader that as regards the
claims of non-clients, a lawyer is generally immune from liability for harm caused
unintentionally except in limited circumstances. Id. at cmt. f. See also Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 55, at 633-34. Since applicants for relief from Regulations are
non-clients, this would seem to absolve (except in those limited circumstances
appearing in Section 51 of the R3LGL) the attorney from any culpability under the
R3LGL for his acts affecting non-clients.
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separation of powers between judicial and legislative branches of
government. 56 The comments to Restatement § I indicate that, so
long as a legislative body adopts behavioral standards applying to
attorneys that do not "substantially differ from similar regulation
applicable to members of other professions," such a code will not
violate the separation of powers. 5 7  Consequently, a state
legislature or municipal council is not precluded on constitutional
grounds from imposing standards of ethical conduct for use by
Atticus, and some have chosen to do so.5
State supreme courts and bar associations have declined to
address the "Atticus code" in local jurisdiction adjudication.
Absent an association of administrative law officials', or a local
government's, adoption of standards for ethical conduct, Atticus is
ungoverned by formal, uniform professional responsibility rules.
If a public servant attorney is not an officer of the court 59 or a
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
* See R3LGL, Chapter 1, §1, Reporter's Note to Comment c., at 12 (2000).
The same note refers to court decisions that "courts will share the power to regulate
lawyers with other branches of government so long as this poses no threat to the
continued vitality of the judicial branch." Id. at 13.
" See, e.g., City of Murfreesboro, Tennessee "Request for Qualifications for
Attorneys," available at http://www.rccba.org/qualifications.html (last visited Nov.
11, 2010). The City of Murfreesboro sought attorneys interested in serving as a
Hearing Officer for the City's Disciplinary Review Board to submit their
qualifications. This citizen board considers employee appeals of city job
terminations. This job posting noted that:
The following canons of the Judicial Code shall be applicable to
Hearing Officers: Canon 1. A Hearing Officer shall uphold the
integrity and independence of the Position of Hearing Officer. Canon
2. A Hearing Officer shall avoid impropriety and the appearances of
impropriety in all of the Hearing Officer's activities. Canon 3. A
Hearing Officer shall perform the duties of Hearing Officer impartially
and diligently. A violation shall constitute grounds for dismissal by
the City Council, upon recommendation of the Disciplinary Review
Board which shall afford the Hearing Officer the right to a hearing.
Id. Murfreesboro deftly incorporates by reference the first three canons of
the CJC, while creating an enforcement process that assures public confidence in the
administrative hearing process without offending the judicial branch of Tennessee
government.
59 See, e.g., Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 378-79 (1866) ("Attorneys and
counselors are not officers of the United States They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal
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judge,60 and adjudicates unchecked by ethical restraints, is the
public well served? Is a vacuum in governing codes of judicial or
professional responsibility likely to aid or to hinder Atticus in
upholding applicable community law? Such local adjudicators
have fallen into a fissure, that thin space between professional
regulation and governmental inattention to Atticus's obligations
surrounding his unique public office.
V. ATTICUS UNBOUND
A. The Cautionary Tale
This anecdote illustrates how free-wheeling Atticus can do
harm, immersed in the murky depths of indeterminate local
administrative policy. The Phoenix Zoning Ordinance's section on
signs contains the City's regulation scheme for billboards,
commonly called "outdoor advertising structures" ("OAS").6 1 The
pertinent code section designates, unambiguously, the locales in
which OAS are permitted, separated into two categories.62 The
first category is arterial streets as indicated on the City's (typically)
learning and fair private character"); In re Wren, 285 P.2d 761, 763 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
6o Judges are subject to a Code of Judicial Conduct in every state. See
Salkin, supra note 34, at 21; see also supra note 25. In State Bar of Arizona Ethics
Opinion 89-01, the State Bar Ethics Committee notes in one comment to Ethical
Rule 1.12(b) that attorney hearing officers satisfy the definition of "adjudicative
officer." See AZ Jud. Adv., Op. 89-01, at 2 (Mar. 1989). The opinion only
discussed, however, the propriety of that official's negotiating for employment with
law firms appearing before the hearing officer. Moreover, in Advisory Opinion 92-
03, the Arizona Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee held that an
administrative law judge is not governed as to her or his conduct by the Arizona
Code of Judicial Conduct because of the lack of independence of the hearing officer
from the "interference and control" of the heads of the administrative agencies and
departments for which hearing officers work. See supra note 49. These opinions aid
little in resolving the issue, since the latter negates guidance as to appropriate
conduct while the former addresses conduct of a former adjudicative officer, not a
sitting one. One must guess who-if anyone-will accept jurisdiction in the
circumstances of alleged malfeasance by an Arizona attorney acting as hearing
officer, unless a municipality has a public officials' code of ethics applicable to
persons serving as independent contractors or volunteer hearing officers.
61 PZO § 705(2)(A).
62 PZO § 705(2)(A)(15).
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annually-updated street classification map. 63 The second category
is tracts located within 300 feet of the mainline, within the city
limits, of certain portions of two highways incorporated in the
federal interstate system.64  Excluded, by default, from this short
list of OAS-permitted locations are portions of one interstate route
and three state expressways servicing the Phoenix conurbation that
lie within the City's boundaries. 65 These expressways are limited
access routes but receive separate funding from the federal
interstate system and have lower speed limits than their federal
counterparts. Only a weak argument can be made that the
expressways are no different from the interstate highways. This
argument is undermined by a statement in the same chapter of the
Phoenix Zoning Ordinance: "Any use that is not specifically
permitted or analogous to those specifically permitted is hereby
declared to be a prohibited use and unlawful."6 6
In 2011, a national outdoor advertising company pursued a
variance under the Phoenix Zoning Ordinance from the location
limitations described in the code's subpart (A)(15).67 It did not
initially seek an opinion from the City Attorney's Office on the
legitimacy of this request. Reviewing the application for the OAS
adjustment, the zoning hearing officer recognized two
6' This map currently is designated Resolution No. 20882 (Jan. 20, 2010),
available at http://phoenix.gov/planning/stclass.pdf.
6 These are Interstate Highways 10 and 17. The "mainline" is the term used
to exclude land improved with access ramps to the interstates. In addition, outdoor
advertising structures may be located only in C-3, A-1, or A-2 zoning districts, the
least restrictive (of intensive uses) zoning districts. See PZO § 705(2)(A)(15).
65 None of these expressways extends beyond the boundaries of Maricopa
County, so by definition they are not "interstates."
66 PZO § 701, Preamble (emphasis added). While the applicant may argue
that a higher-than surface street speed limit makes an expressway analogous to an
interstate highway, there is a difference in the scenic character of these parkways
that travel through residential areas that distinguishes them from interstate corridors.
67 Variances adjust the realities of community land use circumstances in
ways that strict interpretations of Regulations would not permit. Variances allow
deviations from physical standards like floor-area ratios for buildings and off-street
parking burdens. In effect, variances are constitutional safety valves, affording relief
from the black-and-white application of a code provision producing a unique
hardship to an owner that resembles confiscation. See DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR. &
CECILY T. TALBERT, CURTIN'S CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW 44
(2001).
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complexities. First, he realized that the City's planning
administration had no fixed policy on the use of the variance
process along limited access highways.68 Second, he was aware
that, unfettered by local ethical constraints, Atticus might elect to
hear, on their "merits," such billboard adjustment applications, and
to grant variances enduring the appeals process involving the
City's Board of Adjustment (composed of citizens who would pay
little heed to the narrowly-drawn text of the billboard ordinance)
and the Arizona Superior Court. Here was Atticus's moment - an
opportunity to approve an unprincipled but adjudication-derived
ordinance text amendment expanding the parameters of OAS-
permitted sites within the City. Atticus might assert quasi-judicial
authority in a public hearing, usurping the legislative act of
amending a zoning ordinance's text following public input.
Instead, the appropriate course of action was taken, acknowledging
Atticus's lack of jurisdiction, thereby avoiding a "use variance" 69 _
the method by which the applicant sought to alter the explicit text
of the Phoenix Zoning Ordinance pertaining to permitted OAS
locations. The decider asserted under the separation of powers
doctrine and under the "unlawful" code text that he lacked the
power to hear the adjustment request at all. 70  The decider's
6 The Phoenix Planning Department was accepting applications for
variances in this situation when it ought not to have done so, given the PZO's
description of the unlawful nature of using any other location for an OAS.
69 See Nicolai v. Bd. of Adjustment, 101 P.2d 199, 201 (Ariz. 1940).
Prohibiting use variances is codified in ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §9-462.06(H)(1)
(Board of Adjustment cannot change permitted uses set forth for zoning districts or
other zoning classifications). Factually, it appeared there was no plausible argument
that the state road, known as the Piestewa Freeway, having a 55 mph limit, was an
arterial surface street on the City's street classification map or an interstate highway
under the zoning classification.
70 See Minutes of hearing ZA-234-10-2 (Feb. 24, 2011), available at
http://phoenix.gov/pubmeetr/1027.html (copy of written findings available at the
Planning Department, City of Phoenix, contact via electronic mail at
zoning@phoenix.gov). See also Michael Clancy, Phoenix board to consider
Piestewa/Bell electronic billboard, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Apr. 6, 2011, 08:34 AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/community/nephoenix/articles/2011/04/06/20110406phoe
nix-hearing-set-piestewabell-billboard-request.html. Another OAS company applied
for "unlawful" structure variances but continued them, awaiting the disposition of
the preceding applicant's request referred to the City Board of Adjustment by the
hearing officer. On April 7, 2011, that Board determined that it had jurisdiction to
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response recognized the division of authority between the City
Council (empowered to approve text amendments) and the Board
of Adjustment (empowered to adjudicate modifications to required
development standards in appropriate situations).
This narrative reveals nothing about the integrity of a
community's bureaucracy. Those lacking legal training do not
focus on issues of professional responsibility. These matters are
not part of their portfolio or experience. The story instead reveals
the narrow straits separating Atticus's performance of public
service from Atticus's abuse of public office. Granted, zoning
regulation has a particularly sullied reputation for opportunistic
conduct in public officialdom.7 1 However, zoning is hardly the
lone source of questionable execution of duties in the public
interest within a community.
A. Community Expectations
Agency and government administrators may succeed in
vetting for decider positions all but the cleverest of rascals. Should
community personnel invest scarce resources to speculate about
which decider will find that, since an ordinance or similar
regulation is not to his taste, he will adjudicate by personal
intention instead? Will a particular decider dispense "rough
justice" or apply a "nullification" 72  norm? Decisional
hear the applicant's request on the merits. See Public Meeting Results, phoenix.gov
(Apr. 7, 2011),http://phoenix.gov/pubmeetr/index.html.
n1 See, e.g., Rodney L. Cobb, Land Use Law: Marred by Public Agency
Abuse, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 195, 206 (2000) (land use law has a "battle-scarred
complexion," as abusive public agencies have undermined land use planning and
regulation and as a result, the political, moral and financial support for essential
public interest programs); Mark Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in
Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REV. 161, 168 (1989) (uncontrolled decision-
making potentially interferes with broader public land use goals).
72 Nullification is ably illustrated by Captain Hector Barbossa, the undead
pirate (portrayed by Geoffrey Rush) who, in considering his prisoner Elizabeth
Swann's invoking the right of parlay from the Pirate Code, deems the latter to be
"more what you'd call 'guidelines' than actual rules." See Pirates of the Caribbean:
Curse of the Black Pearl, sc. 7 (2003). Barbossa is a consequentialist, holding that
rules can be interpreted via other norms than legal constructs in special
circumstances, where the social need is sufficiently worthy. Id. Furthermore,
despite Swann's possessing a pirate medallion, procedurally Barbossa rules that
Swann lacks standing - she is not a pirate. Id. See also WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE
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independence allows local deciders to uphold the rule of law.73
Without the influence of externally-imposed standards of conduct,
however, that same independence enables disregard for precedent,
logic, incontrovertible evidence, or codified law in favor of
implementing personal agendas on mere whims. 74
If an attorney's legal education and orientation to ethics in
practice has been meaningful and, assuming further that a decider
is not sociopathic, written standards of ethical conduct as a polestar
in Atticus's role ought to be superfluous.75 Mr. Finch, for one,
distinguished "just purpose" from "unjust behavior" and
steadfastly followed his convictions about that distinction,
disregarding hostile public opinion while maintaining his personal
integrity. That Finch's personal code was all-sufficient guidance
for ethical attorney conduct is summarized by one community
figure: "Whether Maycomb knows it or not, we're paying the
highest tribute we can pay a man. We trust him to do right. It's
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 84-93 (1998) (discusses
arguments undergirding nullification as a mode to accommodate formal law to
practical circumstances, such as where wrongdoing is inferentially ratified by
officials who decline to impose sanctions for violations).
11 Professor Epstein encapsulates the conundrum of the "administrative
state." See Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, 7 NAT'L AFF. 39, 39-40
(2011), available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/goverment-
by-waiver (the law involves the public administration of rules by "a wide range of
elected and appointed officials in an endless array of circumstances," maintaining a
just legal order challenges government to limit "the discretion of these officials so
that they do not undermine the rule of law, while also allowing them enough leeway
to perform their essential roles." Epstein notes the vagaries of statutory language,
together with delegation of interpretation to government officials, permits the latter,
effectively, to "make the rules up as they go along." Id.
74 See, e.g., In re Hague, 315 N.W.2d 524, 533 (Mich. 1982) (willful
disregard for law constituted interference with proper administration of justice;
Article III judge sanctioned under Canon 2(B) of the Michigan Code of Judicial
Conduct).
" See, e.g., John D. Feerick, Ethics, Lawyers and the Public Sector: A
Historic Overview, in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 1, 10 (1999) (public
servants "must find ways to establish clear, internal codes of conduct . . ."). But
see M. Neil Browne, Carrie M. Williamson & Linda L. Barkacs, The Purported
Rigidity of an Attorney's Personality: Can Legal Ethics be Acquired?, 30 J. LEGAL
PROF. 55 (2006) (describes debate regarding the capacity of lawyers to receive moral
instruction based upon whether personality traits such as propensity for honesty are
ingrained or evolve under the environmental influence of the legal profession).
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that simple." 76 Perhaps as a practical matter, consciousness of the
"golden rule" 77 (or maybe, the principle of payback) ought to curb
Atticus's temptation to abuse his office, particularly if he
represents clients before another community's administrative
adjudicators.
But for twenty-first century local government servants,
one's compass functions optimally with reference to charts and
navigational benchmarks. Maycomb and public trust are largely
vestiges of the past. This author finds no joy in discovery or
exploitation of gaps in the application of ethical codes to Atticus,
however much a lawyer's training may inspire such endeavors.7 8
Departure from the administrative realm of Finch-like public
servants in adjudication settings is lamentable - if such a bygone
day ever existed. Alas, in today's communities, external controls
are the sensible solution to curbing decider potential abuses. State
judiciaries and bar associations have a role to play here, to remove
the onus from communities by implementing conduct standards
expressly applying to Atticus in local government roles. Notably,
Americans generally expect that law will address ethics in public
life in a holistic, not a piecemeal, manner.79
Four basic arguments support imposing governing standards
for all deciders. First, upholding an ethical obligation of fairness
sustains public confidence in the local government's adjudicative
76 HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 236 (1960).
n "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do
ye even so to them." Matthew 7:12 (King James).
78 See, e.g., WALTER BENNETT, THE LAWYER'S MYTH: REVIVING IDEALS IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 18 (2001) (Bennett recounts an episode during his time in
practice when he searched his state's rules of professional conduct; his quest was to
devise a plausible argument that certain rules in question did not apply and his
delight that his ability to think like a lawyer had allowed him to maneuver "deftly
around the potential ethical roadblock." Id. Reflecting later upon this episode,
Bennett states that "[t]here were no moral questions beyond the plausible bounds of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. There were no higher principles to consult or
personal standards to bring into play. There was no conscience." Id. at 19; see also
Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenspan, Constructing the Field of Professional
Responsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37, 38-39, 77 (2001)
(arguing that in the traditional law school curriculum, students learn to think of
professional responsibility as detached from moral considerations, lawyers being
instead governed by a "specialized law of lawyering").
7 See Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Government at the Local Level, 36
SETON HALL L. REv. 715, 724 (2006).
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process.s0  Second, uniform ethical standards further "upgrade"
local adjudicative systems to meet public expectations." Third,
emphasizing local government ethics builds momentum towards
elevated standards of ethical conduct at senior levels of
government.82 The final argument addresses Atticus the decider
rather than the community. The American public today rejects the
notion that persons trained in the law are sustainably self-regulated
by ethical norms.8 ' A significant fraction of that public believes
instead that, left to his own devices, the attorney is untrustworthy.
The American media does little to dissuade consumers of this
belief.84 Thus, American confidence in the adjudicative process is
enhanced when guidelines discourage Atticus from acting
irresponsibly in his decider role.85
8 Diana Gillis, Closing an Administrative Loophole: Ethics for the
Administrative Judiciary, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 863, 871 (2009).
8 Salkin, supra note 34, at 31. Salkin asserts that the administrative
judiciary has not received enough adverse exposure to compel governments to
provide guidance for their relatively "low profile" adjudicators. Id at 7. See also
Johnson, supra note 79, at 723 (the American public and media support enacting
ethical standards).
82 See id at 718. Johnson argues that rising expectations and public
demands for ethics will migrate upward as the public is increasingly satisfied with
local government ethical standards. Id.
8 See, e.g., Honesty/Ethics in Professions, GALLUP (Nov. 19-21,
2009),http://www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx (13% of
sample believed lawyer integrity was above average, while 40% of sample believed
integrity of lawyers to be "low" or "very low"); Eugene Gaetke, Expecting Too
Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. PITT. L. REv. 693, 695 n.2 (2006) (identifies
a variety of polls pertaining to attorney honesty and ethics, reporting negative
results). For this reason, attorney discipline is viewed as imposed in the service of
the public and the legal system generally, as well as to protect the legal profession
from "unprofessional conduct." See In re White-Steiner, 198 P.3d 1195, 1197 (Ariz.
2009).
84 Even "establishment" print publications enjoy jabbing at lawyers'
imperfections of character, especially on integrity issues. See, e.g., 54 AMERICAN
HERITAGE 14 (Nov./Dec. 2003) (the derivation of "shyster" is the German word
[scheisse] for excrement).
8 Salkin, supra note 34, at 31. An additional consequence of governance of
local hearing officers under ethical standards is the likelihood of elimination of state
bar complaints by disgruntled citizens who discover the hearing officer is a private
attorney, or alternatively, the dismissal of such complaints by the bar on the basis
that another governance standard, not the jurisdiction's rules of attorney professional
responsibility, is applicable under the circumstances grieved.
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It is surprisingly unchallenging to steer Atticus, where
support for applicable law is concerned. A few direct expressions
of local government intention suffice, for example: "The Zoning
Officer shall administer the Zoning Ordinance in accordance with
its literal terms . . ."86 or, "A city administrative law judge must
follow the law."" Yet these ad hoc solutions to a pervasive
problem will yield to a more effective and global approach, which
is addressed next.
VI. ADOPTING THE ATTICUS CODE
Fundamentally, there are four approaches allowing
communities, with the aid of state supreme courts or legislatures,
to address the lack of applicable ethical standards. First is to urge
amendment of the state's judicial conduct code to include
administrative law judges, hearing officers, umpires, masters,
referees and others who perform community adjudicative roles
upon considering evidence and hearing testimony.88 A second
approach, via agency rulemaking or legislation, is to seek the
adoption of a statewide code of ethics or professionalism
applicable to adjudicators at every level in all branches of
government. 89 A third approach is to amend public employees'
86 TAYLOR BOROUGH, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 9.140, initial clause,
available at http://taylorborough.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/article9-zo.pdf.
8' RULES OF CONDUCT FOR ADMIN. LAW JUDGES & HEARING OFFICERS OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK CITY § 103(A)(1) (2009); see also § 102(A) ("shall respect
and comply with the law"). Compare North Dakota's faithfulness to law
formulation, infra note 94.
" See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §24-30-1003(4)(a) (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14.48(2) & (3)(d) (2007). Salkin, supra note 34, at 22, notes that legitimate
arguments exist not to apply Article III judges' ethical standards to persons who are
essentially employees of an agency, making decisions on the agency's behalf. This
argument is less persuasive in a "central panel" jurisdiction, where the hearing
officers are employed by a government department that is tasked with supplying
other agencies with adjudicators; the latter agencies do not control retention or
compensation of the hearing officer.
89 See e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. §1102 (a public official is any person appointed
in any branch of state government "or any political subdivision thereof," excluding
advisory board members lacking authority to "exercise the power of the State or any
political subdivision thereof'); WASH. CODE OF ETHICS FOR ADMIN. L. JUDGES (April
1, 1993); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11475-11475.70 (2009) (§11475.40 describes which
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codes of ethics so as unambiguously to include administrative law
judges and deciders of all types in local governments,
incorporating the broadest definition of "employees" or "officials,"
whether or not the adjudicators are independent contractors or
volunteers in their roles occupied.90 Finally, a community may
convince the state to adopt a model code specifically for non-
Article III adjudicators, which extends to a community's
administrative law judges, hearing officers, and like officials.91
There are a number of sources of standards to guide the
behavior of Atticus that can be adopted in jurisdictions currently
lacking applicable codes or statutory standards of conduct. In
August 1995, the National Conference of Administrative Law
Judges endorsed the ALJ Code. 92 Four years later, the Judicial
Administrative Division of the American Bar Association adopted
its own version of the Model Code for Administrative Law
Judges.93 One version or the other of this model code has been
adopted wholly or partially in several American jurisdictions. 94 it
Canons of the State's Code of Judicial Ethics do not apply to administrative law
judges).
90 See Johnson, supra note 79, at 727-28; see, e.g., S.C. State Ethics Comn.,
Adv. Op. 95-007, at 1-2 (Jan. 18, 1995) available at
ethics.sc.gov/AOs/AO95007.NEW.doc. One code that describes adjudicators
steeping themselves in law and adhering to its guidance is the American Society for
Public Administration's Code of Ethics, available at
http://www.aspanet.org/scriptcontent/indexcodeofethics.cfm/. For a description of
efforts to transform mere conduct guidelines into ethical behavior standards in public
administration, see James S. Bowman, From Codes of Conduct to Codes of Ethics:
The ASPA Case, in TERRY L. COOPER, ED. HANDBOOK OF ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS
335-354 (2001).
9 See Salkin, supra note 34, text at notes 23-50 (summarized each type of
approach and identifies states that have pursued these approaches prior to the 2007
ABA revision of the Model Judicial Code of Conduct.)
" See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
1 The preamble to the ALJ Model Code defines "administrative law judge
or judge . . . to include all hearing officers, referees, trial examiners or any other
person holding non-partisan office to whom the authority to conduct an
administrative adjudication has been delegated by the agency or by statute and who
exercises independent and impartial judgment in conducting hearings and in issuing
recommended decisions or reports containing findings of fact and conclusions of law
.Id.at2.
94 The ALJ Model Code was adopted in 1999 in North Dakota, available at
http://www.deontologie-judiciaire.umontreal.ca/fr/magistrature/documents/north-
dakota-code-of-judicial-conduct.pdf. Its Part 2, "Applicability," states that it reaches
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provides guidance on limited ethical fronts on issues confronting
hearing officers; one example is the circumstance of part-time state
agency adjudicators.95 The AU Model Code does not itself
provide for an entity charged with issuing formal or informal
interpretations of the strictures of the code; as such, its strictures
seem aspirational rather than obligatory. 96  Regardless, where a
direct expression of standards of ethical conduct is desirable, the
AU Model Code awaits local government extension to its
deciders, likely without risk of challenge by the jurisdiction's
state's government. The AU Model Code defines "administrative
law judge" to include "all hearing officers, referees, trial examiners
or any other person holding non-partisan office to whom the
authority to conduct an administrative adjudication has been
delegated by the agency or by statute . . . ."97 In Canon 2(A), that
code states the judge "shall respect and comply with the law." 98
The Commentary to that Canon defines improprieties to include
"temporary contract administrative law judges." Canon 2A requires administrative
law judges to "respect and comply with the law" and the commentary to the canon
emphasizes the compliance obligation. N.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANNON
2A. North Carolina adopted its version of the code in 2000. See N.C. GEN STAT.
§7A-754 (1999) (adopted all but Canon 5). In 2009, the New York State Bar
Association adopted its code version. See supra note 34. In addition, the
Department of Industrial Accidents of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
adopted the ALJ Model Code. Most uniquely, a professional association, the
Oregon Association of Administrative Law Judges, adopted its own Code of
Conduct for administrative law judges, available at
http://www.oregon.gov/OAH/Code of Ethics.shtml, which requires an
administrative law judge to "be faithful to the law" and prescribes that the
adjudicator "shall decide . . . on the basis of facts and applicable law." OR. CODE OF
ETHICS FOR ADMIN. L. JUDGES §2-105.
9 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANNON 5(G), comment.
(contemplates part-time hires of administrative law judges who maintain a law
practice).
96 But see W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2005). Section 6B-2-5a of
the West Virginia Code provides that the West Virginia Ethics Commission
Committee on Standards of Conduct for Administrative Law Judges has the
prerogative to issue advisory opinions, investigate complaints of violations, and
enforce its provisions. Id. at § 6B-2-5a. In West Virginia, "any public employee,
public officer, referee or trial examiner" is subject to the code, other than those
persons whose conduct is subject to the State's Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. at
5a(a). Ruch, supra note 2, at 17, states that this model of establishing an enforceable
code is the exception, not the rule.
9 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT preamble.
98 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A), at 3.
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violations "of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this
code." 99 Similarly, Canon 3(A) states that "a state administrative
law judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it."100 Alternatively, the appropriate state authority
can adopt the 2007 version of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
extending it to members of the administrative law judiciary.
While supreme courts and state legislatures are not racing to
fill voids in standards of performance for local hearing officers,
endeavors to address egregious breaches of behavioral norms have
been undertaken occasionally. For instance, the Washington State
Office of Administrative Hearings addresses complaints of
improper conduct by administrative law judges, with investigation
and discipline being handled internally. 101 Finally, a community
can retool its code of employees' ethics to govern any person,
including independent contractors and volunteers engaged in
adjudication, thereby reminding Atticus to seek out, interpret, and
apply with integrity the existing state and local laws, ordinances,
and regulations.' 02
VII. CONCLUSION
Professor Fred Zacharias, in a 2009 article entitled The Myth
of Self-Regulation,0 3 argues that the term "self-regulation"
trumpeted by American lawyers and judges creates the "patently
false"' 04 public image of lawyers unilaterally governing the
conduct of their peers. 05  As a consequence of that image,
99 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, at 4.
100 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(2), at 7.
101 See WASH. REV. CODE § § 34.05.202 & 34.12.030.99-20-115 (2008);
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 10-16-010 (2008).
102 Direction to follow applicable adjudicative standards needs to be
accompanied by local administrative management systems and processes that
supervise, educate and mentor ad hoc temporary hearing officers, no less those who
are bar admittees. Given the stakes in adjudication, continuing training in that field
is equally important to continuing education for those in private law practice.
103 Fred Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147
(2009).
10 4 Id. at 1188.
1o5 Id.
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Zacharias contends that an external regulator of conductl 06 can be
led to assume other regulators' deference to the bar,107 thereby
inviting inadequate exercise of its own authority to constrain
lawyer conduct.108  This Article has argued that Zacharias's
observations can be seriously problematic in circumstances
involving the collective failure of governments and institutions to
afford adequate guidance to Atticus. Perhaps nowhere does the
unhappy result of a commonly held belief that "I thought you were
handling the ethics piece!" manifest itself more profoundly than in
local government settings.
Consequently, a local government's adoption of an Atticus
Code will entail some coordination between the community and
the state supreme court. When Atticus convenes a hearing, will
there be a clear delineation of applicable conduct standards to his
temporary office? Does Atticus ever (or always) serve two
regimes concurrently? Otherwise stated, is Atticus forever the
lawyer - and will explicit external guidelines for ethical conduct
broaden or limit his obligations in his adjudicator's role?l0 9
Professional administrators and citizens alike acknowledge
that the administrative state, dependent as it is upon the
adjudicative function, is "indispensable" to American
106 Zacharias explains that administrative agencies, federal and state
legislators and courts individually are external regulators of attorney conduct. Id. at
1147-48, 1154.
107 Id. at 1154 (with the regulator thereby undervaluing the "deferring"
regulator's acts).
08 Id.
109 See Johnson, supra note 79, at 726-27. Mere articulation of standards of
conduct does not, of course, ensure that attorneys will receive clear guidance.
Indeed, as Baron & Greenstein, supra note 78, point out, ethical rules are both
under- and over-inclusive as to application, prohibiting some "right" conduct and
allowing some "wrong" conduct. Id. at 78. Since rules are variable in meaning and
open-textured, when an ethical rule must be interpreted, disparate "construction
rules" inform the interpretation, for instance giving the rule its plain (here, English-
language dictionary) meaning, applying the meaning intended by its author, or
applying the meaning that best carries out the rule's purpose; and, to the extent
meanings generated by interpretation are in conflict, this compromises the ability of
any rule to guide behavior with a high degree of certainty. Id. at 77-79. That
conclusion, and the skepticism of scholars about such codes' capacity to provide
clear answers, ought not convince communities to abandon endeavors to guide
otherwise unfettered private attorneys serving temporarily as local hearing officers.
Id at 84-85.
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governance.110 That belief mandates efforts to articulate and
impose the highest standards of ethical conduct governing ad hoc
adjudicators for the ultimate benefit of institutions and to uplift
public trust. Although adopting a code integrating moral precepts
with mandatory conduct standards may seem daunting work, in a
government's transaction of its business - the people's business -
public confidence flourishes where articulated ethical standards
steer Atticus.
1o See Gillis, supra note 80, at 869.
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APPENDIX
For the sake of uniformrity and to avoid the reader forming
irrelevant (and false) impressions of hierarchy or like matters of
heft, I frequently have used in this essay three terms defined
below: "Atticus," "community," and "decider."
"Atticus" means the person who serves the community as a
decider who also is a member in good standing of the bar in the
jurisdiction of his domicile and public service.
"Community" means the jurisdiction convening public
administrative hearings presided over by deciders. Community
includes cities, towns, villages, boroughs, burgs, wards, counties,
parishes, and all manner of special districts such as school districts,
regional transportation authorities, utilities' districts, water and
sewer districts, community facilities' districts and special
assessment and taxing districts to the extent these are local (i.e.,
not state agency) bodies.
"Decider" describes a person who presides over an
administrative adjudicative proceeding in a community; provided,
a decider is not (i) elected, (ii) appointed permanently or for a
significant-length fixed term, (iii) hired as an employee of the
community, (iv) an administrative law judge as defined by a Model
Code for Judicial Conduct for Administrative Law Judges, or (v)
an "Article III" type judge. Deciders include hearing officers,
masters, referees, umpires and other quasi-neutral decision-makers
who rule following the public presentation of evidence and
testimony. Deciders may or may not be attorneys.
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